The Political Economy of Fear in an Age of Crime and Insecurity

By Zoe Papakyriakou

While crime has always impacted political and economic choices, its growing visibility now shapes how citizens vote, invest, and assess public institutions in democratic societies. What starts as political messaging and policy responses to insecurity can stretch well beyond public safety. It can affect housing markets, business decisions, and how public resources are distributed. As images of urban chaos circulate through media and campaign rhetoric, public perceptions of insecurity increasingly influence how state authority is exercised. In this environment, fear shapes political competition and market behaviour in ways that raise a deeper question about how power is reconfigured under perceived threat. Is fear becoming a political strategy?

Why Fear Now Shapes Politics and Markets

In recent years, public concern about violence, organised crime, and urban insecurity has intensified across both Europe and the United States, placing safety at the centre of both electoral campaigns and policy debates. Reports from the Council of the European Union’s Analysis and Research Team, drawing on assessments by Europol and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, warn that criminal networks are increasingly eroding public trust, but also distorting markets and challenging the authority of democratic governance. At the same time, survey data indicate that citizens often perceive crime as intensifying, even when official statistics show a mixed picture, with some offences rising, others declining, and patterns differing across regions and time periods. This highlights a widening gap between public perceptions of crime and official statistical evidence. Media environments and political messaging intensify this phenomenon, as they prioritise visibility and emotional resonance over actual statistical nuance.  In this way, they allow for narratives of insecurity to travel faster and further than the data itself. Under these conditions, fear begins to function not only as a social reaction to crime, but as a governance variable that increasingly shapes policy agendas, electoral strategies, and the direction of both public and private investment.  

Fear as an Economic Force, Not Just a Social Emotion

Fear not only shapes our political preferences, but it also restructures our economic behaviour in ways that are increasingly visible in urban and financial environments. Economic research shows that increased perceptions of risk lead to a “flight to safety.” This behavior prompts households and businesses to favour secure assets, save more, and choose low-risk investments instead of more productive but uncertain options. When translated into the spatial logic of cities, this trend appears as a greater emphasis on perceived safety. Capital and consumers are drawn to neighborhoods known for stability and security, as well as a strong institutional presence. Simultaneously, businesses either move or reduce operations in areas seen as risky, while property markets start to show a growing divide between 'secure' and 'exposed' zones, such as rising price premiums for monitored or gated housing developments in major metropolitan areas. This embeds fear directly into land values and development patterns. Over time, this process produces uneven urban growth, where investment accumulates in insulated neighborhoods and disinvestment reinforces the economic marginalisation of already vulnerable districts. Ultimately, this generates a self-reinforcing cycle in which perception of risk becomes an economic reality.

Democracy Under Pressure

Fear additionally reshapes the relationship between citizens and democratic institutions, especially by altering how legitimacy, authority, and accountability are negotiated in the public sphere. Related research on European governance suggests that the impact of crime on democracy is not consistent, but mediated by institutional quality, political participation, and public confidence in the rule of law. In high-fear environments, electoral competition increasingly rewards visible and immediate responses, such as expanded policing, tougher sentencing, and broader surveillance powers, including visible increases in patrol presence and urban camera networks in several European cities. In comparison, long-term reforms, which are aimed at social inclusion or urban development, are frowned upon. This dynamic is reflected in the rise of the so-called ‘law and order’ platforms, which typically prioritise expanded policing, tougher sentencing, and enhanced security powers, framing public safety less as a policy domain and more as a signal of political resolve. Progressively, this culminates in a shift in democratic expectations, as citizens come to assess institutions not mainly by fairness or transparency, but by their perceived capacity to deliver control and protection. This, in turn, acts as a form of pressure on liberal norms that promote democratic resilience.

Is Fear Being Politically Engineered?

While crime and insecurity present real challenges for democratic societies, research in political communication suggests that public attention is shaped as much by framing and visibility as by actual incidence. Media emphasis, the selective use of statistics, and symbolic incidents can elevate certain risks into dominant political narratives, guiding what citizens perceive as urgent and actionable. In recent campaigns, including the 2024 United States presidential race and the European Parliament elections, security has increasingly functioned as a signalling device, where clear messages on crime and enforcement often carry greater political value than complex policy design. Such a dynamic does not require the creation of threats, but rather the prioritisation of particular forms of insecurity within public debates. As years pass, these patterns reshape incentives driving government action. Officials are encouraged to prioritise rapid and highly visible measures over long-term institutional reform, affecting the process in which democratic legitimacy and public trust are constructed.  

Conclusion

Fear is likely to remain a durable feature of contemporary political and economic life. While shaped by concrete security challenges, it is also commonly instrumentalised through the ways in which it is communicated and governed. The central task for democratic systems, therefore, extends way beyond reducing crime. Instead, they should be concerned with restoring confidence in institutions that mediate risk, enforce fairness, and sustain public trust. Policy choices that build trust in public institutions over time can counter the incentives to govern through constant displays of control.  In this sense, fear does not have to function as a political strategy, but rather as a test to assess whether democracies can build resilience instead of normalising permanent insecurity.

Sources: EU Council, Eurobarometer, Financial Times, World Economic Forum, International Monetary Fund, Sustainability Directory, CrimRxiv, American Psychological Association, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, JSTOR, The Parliament, The New York Times

Written by Zoe Papakyriakou

Edited by Sarah Valkenburg and Gabrielle Ludes