How Russia Can Create Fear Without Firing a Shot

By Yefte Prick

Narva, a border city in northeastern Estonia, carries geopolitical weight far beyond its size. It sits opposite the Russian town of Ivangorod, separated only by the Narva River. On one side is Estonia, a member of the EU and NATO. On the other is Russia, whose war against Ukraine has made Europe’s eastern border one of its most sensitive security lines. Narva is politically sensitive because of both location and population. It has around 50,000 residents, roughly 90 per cent Russian-speaking. About half hold Estonian citizenship, more than a third hold Russian citizenship, and a smaller group remains without defined citizenship.

This is why Narva often appears in European security debates: not because the city is unstable or its residents seek conflict, but because it fits a narrative Moscow has used before. Russia has repeatedly claimed that Russian-speaking minorities in neighbouring states are discriminated against and need protection. This argument appeared around Crimea in 2014 and again in 2022, when Putin justified Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by claiming it had to protect people in Donbas from ‘bullying and genocide,’ alongside ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘denazification.’ Narva’s own history adds to these concerns, including an unofficial 1993 autonomy vote later ruled unconstitutional. This leaves Europe with an uncomfortable question: could Narva become Moscow’s next target? A recent online campaign has brought that fear closer to the surface.

An Online ‘Narva People’s Republic’

In March 2026, anonymous social media accounts began circulating the idea of a ‘Narva People’s Republic’ on Telegram, VK and TikTok. Using flags, maps, state-like symbols and militarised imagery, the campaign presented Narva and Ida-Viru as a possible separate political identity. Some posts looked like memes, but the message underneath was more serious: autonomy from Estonia, ‘waiting for Russia,’ and imagined attacks on nearby towns such as Sillamäe and Kohtla-Järve. The label is politically loaded, echoing the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s republics’ in eastern Ukraine, separatist entities central to Russia’s justification for intervention. Narva is not Donbas, and Estonia is not Ukraine. But the language matters because many Europeans link it to Russian hybrid warfare.

Estonian authorities responded carefully. KAPO, Estonia’s Internal Security Service, described the campaign as an information operation aimed at creating confusion and weakening social cohesion. Estonian media reported limited reach and unclear origins. Kaupo Rosin, head of Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, said the Russian government did not appear to be behind it and stressed that it should be monitored without exaggeration. Still, limited reach does not always mean limited impact. In Estonia, even a small separatist narrative around Narva’s Russian-speaking borderland identity can touch a historical nerve.

 How History Shapes Estonia’s Security Concerns

After 1991, Estonia saw itself as the restored Republic of Estonia, whose independence had been interrupted by Soviet occupation. This principle of legal continuity shaped its citizenship policy. Automatic citizenship mainly went to citizens of pre-war Estonia and their descendants, while many Soviet-era migrants and their children had to naturalise, take another citizenship, or remain with undefined citizenship. Naturalisation required long-term residence, knowledge of Estonian and passing a citizenship exam.   

From Estonia’s perspective, these rules protected legal continuity, sovereignty and the Estonian language. For some Russian-speaking residents, they felt exclusionary because many Soviet-era migrants and descendants were not automatically granted citizenship. This illustrates how, since the restoration of independence, integration has been closely tied to national security. Debates over language, education, voting rights and media have been shaped by Soviet occupation’s memory and by fears that Moscow could exploit real or perceived grievances. 

That fear deepened in 2007, when Estonia faced 22 days of cyberattacks after the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet-era monument in Tallinn. Government websites, ministries, media, banks and other services were affected. However, aside from links to Russian IP addresses and the use of the Russian language, there was never conclusive evidence that the Kremlin was behind the attack. But it still touched a politically sensitive nerve in Estonia, even as the country’s caution should not be mistaken for distrust of its Russian-speaking minority.

Narva Is Not a Fifth Column

The biggest mistake would be to treat Narva’s Russian-speaking residents as a fifth column for Moscow. Speaking Russian, consuming Russian-language media or having family across the border does not automatically mean loyalty to Moscow. Many maintain Russian cultural ties while also forming everyday attachments to Estonia. Belonging is often mixed, shaped by citizenship, language, generation and region. A small 2018–2019 survey suggested strong attachment to both Narva and Estonia, showing that identity is layered. Even where political views differ from those of Estonia’s ethnic-Estonian majority, this should not be confused with separatism or a desire to join Russia. The 2025 Foreign Ministry survey identified ethnic divides on Ukraine, NATO and sanctions, but treating such differences as disloyalty risks reinforcing Moscow’s narrative that Russian-speakers are never fully accepted in Estonia.

That is why the online campaign is dangerous. It does not need to reflect reality to have an effect. Narva residents who spoke to Deutsche Welle largely dismissed the ‘Narva People’s Republic’ idea as fake news and ‘complete nonsense.’ In April 2026, Narva’s mayor also criticized the way the city was being portrayed, saying people in the city did not know anything about a real ‘people’s republic’ and that such stories should not be given unnecessary weight.

A Scenario Without Tanks

The most plausible threat to Narva is not an immediate invasion. Military expert Carlo Masala has argued that Russia is unlikely to open a second front while still fighting in Ukraine and that there are no signs of an imminent attack on Narva. Yet he warned that the online campaign should not be dismissed, calling it psychological warfare designed to make people nervous. 

That may be the point. Russia does not need to invade Narva to use it. The city can test NATO anxieties, pressure Estonia, divide public opinion and force Europeans to ask whether the alliance would risk escalation over one border city. Putin’s June 2022 statements show this: by praising Peter the Great and mentioning Narva while discussing Russia’s current mission, he turned the city into a historical and geopolitical reference point. Estonia’s reaction showed that such symbolism is taken seriously, especially during Russia’s war against Ukraine. A ’Narva scenario’ remains unlikely in the form of tanks crossing the bridge tomorrow. But its political usefulness is real. The question is not so much whether Russia will attack, but how Europe responds to the fear that such a possibility creates.

Sources: Euronews, Reuters, ERR News, BBC News, Meduza, Deutsche Welle, Los Angeles Times, Propastop, Migration Policy Institute, European University Institute, NATO CCDCOE, Estonian Ministry of Culture, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), Riigi Teataja, EuropeNow, Vijesti