Accelerating the Green Transition: What Europe can learn from China

By Heiner Burkard

To achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement, the European Union launched the Green Deal, aiming to reach net zero by 2050 and a sharp reduction in emissions over the next 25 years. Although the EU appeared as an early adopter and pioneer in renewable energies and the transition to a green economy, the Union lost this position to China. As the new global superpower continues to build up clean technologies and its renewable energy infrastructure at an incredible pace, Europe becomes more dependent on its geopolitical rival.

Following the Paris Agreement of 2015, the signatories began to implement the agreement’s contents into law and binding action. For the European Union, this meant the launch of the European Green Deal in 2019. By 2050, the EU wants to be carbon neutral, and by 2030, emissions are aimed to be reduced by 55 per cent compared to 1990. It pushes a clean and fair transition that protects its people and the planet by investing in innovation, green technologies and infrastructure. Since its presentation, the Green Deal launched initiatives such as Fit for 55, which includes policies on climate action and the energy transition. Another example is NextGenerationEU, which invests billions of euros in clean technologies and environmental protection. 

In 2022, the European Commission introduced the newly set up REPowerEU plan to ease the challenges and economic damages caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its effort to weaponise Europe’s energy supply. It accelerated the expansion of clean energies and reframed them as a strategic priority for energy independence and security. The EU’s policies set the Union at the forefront of the battle against climate change and put it on pace to become the first climate-neutral continent. However, at the beginning of 2026, an increasing number of reports show that member states will miss their national climate targets under current policy actions. 

Diverging Trajectories: The Emerging Imbalance Between Geopolitical Rivals

As the EU faces significant challenges in implementing measures to achieve its own targets, one of its most important geopolitical rivals is pursuing its energy transition at an unprecedented pace. In early 2025, China’s wind and solar capacity overtook its coal capacity for the first time. This is not only a symbolic but also a structural milestone in its energy generation. Two years prior to that, electricity overtook coal as the largest energy source in industry, which represents a critical step in the energy transition of the second-largest economy in the world. This holds especially true as the industrial sector is the primary driver of  China’s economic growth and the largest energy-consuming sector. By June 2025, its wind and solar energy production produced more electricity than all other sources combined. To bolster that enormous renewable capacity extension, China tripled its battery storage capacity since 2021 and invested 75 billion euros in its energy grid in 2024 alone. The electrification powered by the rapid expansion of renewables goes beyond the power sector. The electricity share of final energy demand reached  32 per cent in 2023. This is well above the EU-level of 24 per cent. It demonstrates China’s dominance, not only in deployment but also in innovation and production. China’s huge manufacturing capacity lowered costs for renewable energy sources beyond the most ambitious forecasts. In Europe, this price compression contributed to the decline of such production capacities, as cheap Chinese products flooded the markets.

As China is scaling up its energy production and reorienting its whole economy in the process, the EU is struggling to adapt its policies to accelerate its own transition. The reasons behind China’s renewable energy boom go beyond the falling prices of solar energy, its manufacturing capacity and its climate policies. The fundamental drivers are policies from the Chinese central government that prioritise renewable energies, not because of their intrinsic conviction to save the planet, but because they follow a strict geopolitical logic, strengthening its wealth and political system. The Chinese government views the traditional fossil fuel-powered growth model as exhausted. As China is reliant on fossil fuel imports and does not hold significant strategic oil reserves, this dependence is regarded as a vulnerability, particularly as the imports or the shipping lanes could be weaponised by its adversaries. Thus, the transition is framed as a new development paradigm, and the shift towards an “ecological civilisation” is even embedded in the constitution. Additionally, the expansion of renewable energies is the primary engine of growth and contributes roughly ten per cent of its gross domestic product in 2024. The expansion follows a “build clean first, then phase down fossil” strategy that expands the clean energy sources and grids before fossil fuel plants are retired. This strategy is coordinated in China’s Five-Year Plans, among other strategies that aim at accelerating the transition by scaling clean energy manufacturing and deployment in parallel. Thus, the success of the Chinese model builds on fundamental policy approaches that set the transition at the centre of its industrial policies. The transition is not faster because China is richer, greener or more idealistic. Rather, it is because its policies are systemic and holistic, addressing not only the energy supply, but also the technologies, demand and infrastructure. Furthermore, the transition is self-reinforcing, as it no longer depends on climate policies or subsidies but on economic dynamics that generate incentives to accelerate the transition further, as illustrated by the tremendous price drop of solar modules.

Lessons for the European Unions from China’s Approach

Integrating the entire supply chain of renewable energy within domestic industrial capacities is also relevant for the EU. Since the Russian invasion, the EU has already begun to understand that the transition is also of geopolitical importance. This lesson has long been understood by China. Meanwhile, the EU runs the risk that it will again be dependent on energy imports. This time, it could be the imports of solar panels, wind turbines or grid technologies from China. To gain independence, the Union needs to establish and protect its clean technologies and energy industries. Tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles are a start, but they address symptoms, not structural causes. Europe must strike a balance that embraces competition to accelerate the transition, but also invests heavily to gain a global technological advantage. Energy independence requires redirecting spending from fossil fuels to renewables that are produced domestically. Europe still spends approximately 375 billion euros on oil and gas imports yearly. While Russian imports have been reduced, the share of United States imports has increased, even though recent events question the reliability of the country as a partner. This spending needs to be reduced to stay on track with the climate targets, but could also be leveraged to innovate and increase manufacturing capabilities. 

China demonstrates that the energy transition accelerates fastest when it is treated as a system-wide economic and geopolitical project, not as a collection of environmental targets. For the EU, the lesson is to match its strategic clarity: aligning climate goals with industrial policy, infrastructure planning, and security interests. If Europe succeeds in turning its transition into a self-reinforcing engine of growth, innovation, and independence, it can remain a global frontrunner. If it fails, it risks repeating a familiar pattern of outsourcing the industries of the transition while paying ever higher prices for energy, technology, and strategic autonomy. The window to choose is narrowing fast.

Sources: World Economic Forum, Financial Times, Ember, Decade Energy, European Commission

Written by Heiner Burkard

Edited by Sarah Valkenburg and Gabrielle Ludes