Europe Votes. Liberal Democracy Blinks

By Francesca Manole

Last weekend, Europe held its breath awaiting election results and cheering for its favourites, and I am not talking about Eurovision. On Sunday, Europe had three major elections: in Romania, Poland and Portugal. At first glance, it seems as if liberal democracy won, but can this be considered a true victory when each election brings us one step closer to the edge of backsliding? Is Europe ready to stand against fascism, or is it slowly stepping into the footsteps of the United States? 

The Illusion of Victory

The 18th of May brought a sigh of relief for Europe’s liberal democrats. Nicușor Dan was elected president of Romania, and Rafał Trzaskowski pulled ahead in the first round of Poland’s presidential vote. Still, the looming shadow of the farright is impossible to ignore. Romania’s ultranationalist George Simion got 46,40 per cent of the votes, and won abroad. Although the pro-European candidate won the first round in Poland, both the second and the third places were secured by hard-right contenders. With Mentzen’s supporters likely to back Nawrocki in the runoff, the second round does not look too promising for liberals. Even in Portugal, the farright made record gains, and the winning centrist party is failing to form a majority government, as they refuse to enter a coalition with the far-right Chega party.  Once again, liberalism may have won the headlines, but the far-right is winning the margins. One can only hope that the current winners do not disappoint or fail to keep the support of their voters, which would bring the extreme closer to power. It would not be the first time, that’s certain.

Why it Matters

The stakes were high in Romania and Poland: Not only for them, but for the future of Europe and Ukraine. As former Eastern Bloc countries and NATO members bordering Ukraine, securing the eastern front, Romania and Poland are central players in Europe’s security architecture. A victory of right-wing populism in states of such geopolitical value would mean less support for Ukraine, exposing Europe’s security vulnerability. For Europe’s sake, it is crucial for the continent to stand united against the Russian threat, but disinformation campaigns, political interference, and acts of sabotage are common tools used by Moscow to divide the continent. 

In Romania’s first attempt at the 2024 presidential elections, ultranationalist Călin Georgescu won the majority in the first round, but his victory was annulled due to accusations of Russian interference. It would not be the first nor the last time the Kremlin has meddled in Romanian politics. Poland, too, has accused Russian intelligence of sabotage and interference multiple times, the most recent case being arson sabotage of a shopping centre.

These hybrid attacks are a silent and subtle war over infrastructure and narratives that Moscow is fighting in Europe, without triggering Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which recognises an armed attack on one member as an attack on all. Thus, whether European populists are direct Russian agents or not, a win for them is an ultimate win for the Kremlin.

Diaspora Votes

Analysing the election results, I could not help but notice that, while Nicușor Dan won the votes abroad in most of the globe, ironically, even in Russia, the Romanians living in Western European countries, such as Germany, France, Italy and the UK, favoured his far-right opponent. This phenomenon proves to be quite paradoxical. One might expect those who choose to live in liberal Western democracies to support the values the European Union was founded on. Surely, if they live there, they endorse the ideals of open society, multilateralism, and pluralism, right?

In reality, many Eastern European migrants experience the West differently. A large proportion of Romanian expats moved to take up low-paid, blue-collar jobs, often out of economic necessity, and many have faced exclusion, discrimination, or cultural alienation, failing to fully integrate. This leaves them vulnerable to populist narratives that emphasise tradition, hierarchy, and belonging, especially when those views were already a consequence of their upbringing in a flawed education system back home. Some Polish migrants are drawn into what scholars have termed “integration through racism”, a process in which they assert a sense of superiority over other immigrant groups by emphasising their ‘Europeanness’. In this context, voting for a far-right candidate is not just political, but emotional. It expresses resentment, identity confusion, and a desire to feel seen and valued, even if it means turning against the very systems that made their migration possible.

Conclusion

The results of this electoral weekend may bring a sigh of relief for defenders of liberal democracy, but they should not inspire complacency. The far right is increasingly becoming an alternative for citizens who feel left behind and unheard. Winning elections is not the same as winning trust, and if liberal democracy hopes to survive, it must do more than win the centre. It must confront the emotional politics of identity, inequality, and alienation that the far right effectively exploits. Europe may have blinked, but it has not yet fallen. The question now is whether it will open its eyes in time or stay on the edge of uncertainty.

Sources: BBC, CFR, ECPR, Middle East Institute, New Statesman, Oxford Academic, Politico, Reuters, Robert Lansing Institute, Romanian Permanent Electoral Authority.

By Francesca Manole

Edited by Roos Hoogesteger & Karla Kohlhaas