EU’s Militarisation: From Diplomacy to Defence

By Francesca Manole

For years, French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europe must take control of its own security, but the concept of strategic autonomy has been debated among European states since it first emerged in the 1950s. However, with Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupting peace on the European continent and Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ policies raising concerns over transatlantic relations, the EU now finds itself in a vulnerable position. The recent Weimar Triangle expansion and Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal for 800 billion euros invested in national defence signal that European leaders are finally ready to face a harsh reality: They cannot depend on the American security umbrella anymore. But as discussions for European rearmament intensify, one quesGon prevails: Is this inevitable, or is there still room for diplomacy?

From a Rejected Ideal to an Accepted Necessity

The concept of European strategic autonomy is not new. It has been debated for decades, but serious defence integration has remained vague. The failed European Defence Community from 1954 exposed the limits of military cooperaGon, while NATO and the U.S. continued to provide Europe’s security throughout the Cold War. Even as the Saint Malo Declaration in 1998 and Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne speech called for greater European defence capabilities, military ambitions stalled due to political divisions and reliance on transatlantic security. That changed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which exposed Europe’s military vulnerabilities and growing uncertainty over U.S. support under successive administrations. Now, the EU is no longer just debating strategic autonomy – it is militarising. The Weimar+ expansion, the €800 billion ReArm Europe initiative, and Macron’s proposal of a French nuclear umbrella reflect a fundamental shift in Europe’s defence posture. At the same Gme, defence budgets are rising across the continent, with Poland planning to spend 4.7% of its GDP on defence, the highest in NATO.

Charles De Gaulle’s Legacy

Since the 1950s, France has been a strong voice against Europe’s reliance on the United States for security. Critical of U.S. influence over European sovereignty, Charles de Gaulle warned that if Europe remained dependent, Washington and Moscow would eventually dictate European affairs without European involvement. Decades later, Macron’s calls for European strategic autonomy echo de Gaulle’s vision, as the EU finds itself sidelined in major geopolitical decisions - most notably when the EU and Ukraine were excluded from the U.S.- Russia negotiation talks in Saudi Arabia. The idea that Europe must be able to defend itself without relying on Washington has defined France’s foreign policy for decades and remains reflected by Macron’s televised speech, where he called for stronger EU unity under a “French Nuclear Umbrella”.

Between Civilian and Military Power: EU’s Identity Crisis

Historically, the European Union has defined itself as a civilian power, prioritising diplomacy, economic strength, and multilateral cooperation over military force. In practice, however, it has relied on American military support throughout the Cold War up until the war in Ukraine. The debate over whether the EU ceased to be a civilian power began with its first military operaGons in the Balkans and Africa, but today, rising geopolitical tensions leave little doubt that the bloc is shifting toward a more assertive military role. While this transformation is gaining momentum and public support, it is also facing criticism, both for its supranational ambitions and the growing influence of the arms industry in EU defence policy. What is certain is that with this historic shift, the EU is confronting an identity crisis unlike any before. 

Winners and Losers: Who Benefits from Militarisation?

European militarisation is not just about security – it is about power, profit, and control. Defence contractors like Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales have increased arms lobbying in Brussels, pushing for deeper military investment under ReArm Europe and EDIP, initiatives that channel billions into the arms industry. Between 2022 and 2023, defence lobbying surged by 40%, raising quesGons about whether security needs or corporate interests are driving policy.

Meanwhile, some naGons see military integration, which some argue is inevitable, as a sovereignty risk. Poland, which spends the most on national defence, remains committed to NATO over an EU-led force, and Hungary’s Orbán fiercely opposes any shift of military power to Brussels. For these states, militarisation is not about deterrence – it is about who controls the decision to act.

These points spark heated debates among policymakers and stakeholders on whether Europe’s military future strengthens its autonomy or makes it dependent on corporate interests, and as defence spending skyrockets, the winners and losers of this shift are becoming harder to ignore.

When Diplomacy Fails, What Else Remains To Do?

Despite the criticism, there are strong arguments in favour of militarisation. For years, European security was a question of diplomacy rather than defence, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shattered that illusion. In Making Europe Unconquerable (1985), Gene Sharp strongly advocates for non-military strategies in European defence. While George F. Kennan, a key architect of Cold War containment, recognised the logic behind Sharp’s proposals, he remained doubtful. He argued that a strategy based on unilateral restraint was idealistic at best and wondered if it could succeed unless all players followed the same rules.

And other players are not following the rules.

Before the full-scale invasion, Russia and Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreements in 2014 to establish a ceasefire and political resolution in eastern Ukraine, but Russia continued to back separatists in the Donbas region before it finally attacked Kyiv in 2022. Before the Minsk Agreements, there was the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, but then Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, violating the agreement.

What is different about the Budapest Memorandum and the Minsk Agreements is how Ukraine reacted after each betrayal. After 2014, Ukraine chose to militarise and to prepare for potential large-scale conflict instead of relying strictly on diplomacy, which took Russia by surprise in 2022 when it expected to capture Kyiv in two weeks, but was faced with a fully prepared Ukraine.

Conclusion

As the war drags on, the question is no longer just how long Ukraine can hold out against Russia, even with Western military support, but what happens next when exhaustion sets in. If Ukrainian sovereignty is as crucial to European security as leaders claim, how far is the EU willing to go? The debate between diplomacy and militarisation intensifies. Should Europe push harder for negotiations to prevent a prolonged conflict? Or is military strength the only possible path to securing Ukraine and deterring future aggression? With a shaky U.S. support and Ukraine’s exhaustion becoming a real threat, the question is not just whether Europe should continue to help but whether it will take a more active role, militarily or diplomatically, in shaping the war’s outcome.

Sources: Le Monde, Reuters, Euro Prospects, AP News, France24, JSTOR, Politico, The New York Review of Books, European Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings, Taylor & Francis Online.

Written by Francesca Manole

Edited by Roos Hoogesteger & Karla Kohlhaas